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Abstract—In order to reduce CO2 emissions, energy systems
using different energy carriers (e.g., heat and power) are be-
coming more intertwined and integrated. However, coordination
between non-cooperative participants of these systems in the
combined heat and power domain has been limited to single-sided
auctions with one centralised seller. In this paper, we present a
double-sided auction mechanism in which prosumers as well as
consumers and producers of heat and power can participate.
By showing that our mechanism is Incentive Compatible and
Individually Rational, we ensure that truthful bidding is the
optimal strategy, simplifying the bidding process and thus accom-
modating agents with limited computational resources. Finally,
we show that our mechanism is fiscally sustainable, i.e., Weakly
Budget Balanced.
Index Terms—Combined Heat and Power, Double Sided Auc-
tions, Mechanism Design
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming is one of the defining challenges of the
21st century. In order to reduce CO2 emissions, significant
investments in energy infrastructure and renewable energy
sources (RES) have been made. These investments have
had profound effects on the energy sector. Excess electricity
production from fluctuating RES had to be curtailed at times
[1], while heating systems have been switched from gas-fired
or electric boilers to combined heat and power plants (CHPs),
which convert fuel much more efficiently by producing both
heat and electricity.
Closer coordination between power and heat systems
promises more efficient use of energy, meaning less curtailment
of RES [1, 2], better use of exhaust heat from industrial
process [3] and more economic operation of CHPs with District
Heating Networks [4]. Attempts of better integration between
heat and power have often focused on how to give individual
CHPs the flexibility to react to fluctuating renewable electricity
production, by considering heat storage – either dedicated
[4, 5] or indirectly in District Heating Networks [6] – or by
extending the operational range through the use of electric
boilers [4, 5]. Zhong et al. [7] (with some extensions in [8])
introduced a multi-energy auction mechanism to coordinate
between self-interested agents. However, this line of work to
date is limited to single-sided auctions in which participants
only buy electricity and heat from a single centralised seller.
We address the problem of facilitating trade between several
producers and consumers across the heat and power domain.
Our results are as follows. We first develop a market model
that allows both consumers and producers as well as power-to-
heat devices to participate. We then design a double auction
mechanism for allocating supply and demand based on trade
reduction [9] for this market model. We show that our
mechanism incentivises agents to participate truthfully in the
market, i.e., the mechanism is Individually Rational (IR) [10]
and Incentive Compatible (IC) [10]. We thereby reduce the
need for the agents to strategize. Lastly we prove that our
market design does not require subsidies, i.e., the mechanism
is Weakly Budget Balanced (WBB) [11].
II. THE MODEL
We introduce our market model and define desirable prop-
erties for pricing mechanisms. Every agent l in the set of
agents N has a desired bundle (il, jl), with il, jl ∈ {0, 1,−1},
and associates a private valuation vl ∈ R with this bundle. i
indicates the amount of electricity while j is the amount of
heat. Positive values in the bundle indicate consumption, while
negative values are associated with production. E.g., a bundle
(1,−1) means an agent wants to consume one electricity and
produce one heat. Every agent l ∈ N submits one bid bl
consisting of its desired bundle and a reserve price ρl ∈ R:
bl = ((il, jl), ρl). The reserve price is the maximum price an
agent is willing to pay for its bundle, with negative values seen
as payments to the agents. Agents posses a quasi-linear utility
function ul(X,P ), where X is the binary allocation vector,
with xl = 1 if agent l is allocated and xl = 0 otherwise, and
P(il,jl) is the price set for bundle (il, jl) by the mechanism.
Not receiving any bundle leaves the agent with zero utility.
ul(X,P ) = vl · xl − P(il,jl) · xl (1)
An allocation is feasible if it results in material balance, i.e.,∑
l∈N il · xl = 0 ∧
∑
l∈N jl · xl = 0, ensuring that every unit
of energy produced is also consumed within the system.
We assume a disinterested market operator concerned with
maximising the social welfare of the system as a whole.
Similarly to [12], we define social welfare as the sum of all
agents (Trader and Auctioneer). The utility of the auctioneer is
the surplus the mechanism generates. We can write the social
978-1-5386-8218-0/19/$31.00 © 2019 IEEE
welfare of an allocation as SW =
∑
l ul + uauctioneer =∑
l
(
vl − P(il,jl)
)
xl +
∑
l P(il,jl)xl =
∑
l vlxl.
Assumption 1: All agents report their true valuation: ρl = vl.
With the above assumption, we can express our task as follows:
SW =
∑
l∈N
ρlxl
s.t.
∑
l∈N
il · xl = 0;
∑
l∈N
jl · xl = 0
xl ∈ {0, 1},
(2)
where the first constraint ensures strict material balance, while
the second constraint prohibits partial allocation of bundles.
A. Properties Relevant to Mechanism Design
In this section, we will justify our assumption of truthful
bidding, ρl = vl, see Assumption 1. To coordinate between
all the bidding agents, a mechanism takes in all bids and
outputs an allocation of trading agents and prices. However,
as the mechanism only receives reported bids (ρl) and not true
valuations (vl), it only maximizes social welfare if the agents
report their private valuations truthfully.
Mechanisms that are Incentive Compatible (IC) make truthful
reporting the utility maximising strategy for every agent
independent of the behaviour of other agents. Assumption 1 is,
therefore, fulfilled under the much weaker assumption of utility
maximising agents if the mechanism is IC. Further, making
truthful reporting the optimal strategy independent of the bids
of other agents obviates the need for sophisticated bidding
strategies. This enables small agents with limited computational
power to efficiently operate in the market. Additionally, to
make participation appealing to agents, the mechanism should
be Individually Rational (IR), i.e., reporting truthfully to the
auctioneer never leads to negative utility for the reporting agent.
However, the seminal paper by Myerson and Satterthwaite
[13] showed that it is impossible to design a mechanism
that is IC, IR, optimal in social welfare and Weakly Budget
Balanced (WBB) at the same time, meaning any optimal, IC
and IR mechanism necessarily runs a budget deficit, making
it unsustainable. This impossibility result can be amended by
trade reduction mechanisms, which artificially raise buying
and lower selling prices by removing trading agents, in effect
sacrificing some social welfare for WBB [9].
The formal definitions of these concepts are as follows:
Definition 1 (IC): [10] A mechanism is IC if for all agents
truthfully reporting their valuation maximises their utility
independent of what others bid.
Definition 2 (IR): [10] A mechanism is IR, if for all agents
truthful reporting never leads to negative utility.
Definition 3 (WBB): [11] A mechanism is WBB, if the
payments by the agents to the mechanism always outweigh
the payments made by the mechanism.
We strive to develop a mechanism that is IC, IR and WBB.
III. TRADE REDUCTION MECHANISM
In this section, we introduce our trade reduction mechanism.
We make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2: No two bids have the exact same valuation.
Assumption 3: The market is deep: there is a sufficient
number of bids per bundle allocated.
Our mechanism outputs both a final allocation and a set of
prices, one for each bundle. As described in Alg. 1, it computes
the optimal allocation X∗ (line 1), removes the lowest two
bids per bundle (lines 5 and 6), and sets the prices to the value
reported by the removed bids (line 4).
Input: Set of Bids B
Output: Final allocation X and prices P
1: X∗ ← argmaxX SW (X,B)
2: for i ∈ {0, 1,−1} do
3: for j ∈ {0, 1,−1} do
4: P(i,j) ← ρs(i,j)
5: x∗k(i,j) ← 0
6: x∗s(i,j) ← 0
7: P ← ⋃i,j∈{0,1,−1} P(i,j)
8: X ← X∗
9: return (X, P )
Alg. 1. Trade reduction mechanism returns the final allocation and prices.
To describe the process in more detail, we introduce k(i, j)
as the allocated agent with the lowest bid for bundle (i, j):
k(i, j) = argminm∈N{ρm|(im, jm) = (i, j) ∧ x∗m = 1}.
Next to k(i, j), we define the next lowest bid for every
bundle as s(i, j).
s(i, j) = argmin
m∈N
{ρm|ρm > ρk(i,j), (im, jm) = (i, j)} (3)
The price for bundle (i, j) is defined by agent s(i, j).
P(i,j) = ρs(i,j), i, j ∈ {0, 1,−1} (4)
A. General Properties
Before we discuss the desired properties of our trade
reduction mechanism (i.e., IR, IC, WBB), we establish some
properties that are required for the proofs in Section III-B.
Notably, we establish that all agents in the final allocation
reported a value above the price defining agent (see Property
2), remain allocated as long as they report a value above the
value of the price defining agent (see Property 7) and cannot
influence the price while allocated (see Property 8).
First we introduce some notation. Let N∗ be the set of all agents
allocated under allocation X∗: N∗ = {l ∈ N |x∗l = 1}.The
set of all agents interested in bundle (i, j) is denoted as
N(i, j) = {l ∈ N |(il, jl) = (i, j)}.
The two agents, k(i, j) and s(i, j), which are removed by
the trade reduction mechanism, will be denoted as N∆(i, j).
This set is clearly defined because of Assumptions 2 and 3.
N∆(i, j) ⊂ N∗(i, j)
s.t. |N∆(i, j)| = 2 ∧ (ρm > ρl)
∀l ∈N∆(i, j),∀m ∈ N∗(i, j) \N∆(i, j)
(5)
Agent s(i, j) is therefore the highest valued bid in N∆(i, j).
s(i, j) = argmax
l
{ρl|l ∈ N∆(i, j)} (6)
The set of all removed bids is defined as N∆ =⋃
(i,j)N
∆(i, j), which allows us to describe the final allocation
N as follows:
N = N∗ \N∆. (7)
We consider an agent l ∈ N interested in bundle (i, j) and
consider the effects of only agent l changing its bid. For this, we
introduce the bidding profile b−l = (b1, b2, ...bl−1, bl+1, ...bn)
as the set of bids from all agents except for agent l. We
define N1∗(((i, j), ρ1l ), b−l) and N
2∗(((i, j), ρ2l ), b−l) as the
optimal allocations resulting from agent l bidding ρ1l and
ρ2l under bidding profile b−l, respectively. For brevity, we
will write N1∗ and N2∗ instead of N1∗(((i, j), ρ1l ), b−l) and
N2∗(((i, j), ρ2l ), b−l).
We show that an allocated agent cannot affect the optimal
allocation by increasing its bid (see Property 1 and Corollary 1)
and describe all allocated agents (see Property 2).
Property 1: Given a bidding profile b−l and an agent l
interested in bundle (i, j) the following statement holds:(
ρ2l > ρ
1
l ∧ l ∈ N1∗
)
=⇒ N1∗ = N2∗.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that ρ2l > ρ
1
l ∧ l ∈ N1∗
and N1∗ 6= N2∗. We define T∆ = N1∗ \ N2∗ and T−∆ =
N2∗ \N1∗, with which we can express N2∗ as follows:
N2∗ =
(
N1∗ \ T∆) ∪ T−∆. (8)
As N2∗ is the optimal allocation given bids B2 =
(((i, j), ρ2l ), b−l), we know that
∑
m∈N2∗ ρ
2
m ≥
∑
m∈N1∗ ρ
2
m.
Applying equation (8) gets us to the following expression:∑
m∈N1∗
ρ2m −
∑
m∈T∆
ρ2m +
∑
m∈T−∆
ρ2m ≥
∑
m∈N1∗
ρ2m∑
m∈T−∆
ρ2m −
∑
m∈T∆
ρ2m ≥ 0. (9)
Given the fixed bidding profile b−l and ρ2l > ρ
1
l , we know
that ρ2m ≥ ρ1m ∀m ∈ N and therefore
∑
m∈T∆ ρ
2
m ≥∑
m∈T∆ ρ
1
m. Furthermore, ρ
1
m = ρ
2
m holds for all m 6= l from
which follows that
∑
m∈T−∆ ρ
2
m =
∑
m∈T−∆ ρ
1
m as l /∈ T−∆.
Applying these insights to equation (9) results in:∑
m∈T−∆
ρ1m −
∑
m∈T∆
ρ1m ≥
∑
m∈T−∆
ρ2m−
∑
m∈T∆
ρ2m ≥ 0∑
m∈T−∆
ρ1m −
∑
m∈T∆
ρ1m ≥0. (10)
There exist two cases for equation (10) – strictly larger
and equality. When
∑
m∈T−∆ ρ
1
m −
∑
m∈T∆ ρ
1
m > 0 holds,
equation (10) contradicts our assumption that N1∗ is optimal, as
N1∗\T∆∪T−∆ results in higher social welfare. When equality
holds, either T−∆ = T∆ = ∅ in which case N1∗ = N2∗ or
there exist multiple optimal allocations, one of which is N2∗;
consistent tie breaking will lead to N1∗ = N2∗.
Corollary 1: Given a bidding profile b−l and an agent l the
following holds:
(
l ∈ N1∗ ∧ l ∈ N2∗) =⇒ N1∗ = N2∗.
Property 2 (Allocated Agents):
ρl > ρs(i,j) ∀l ∈ N(i, j)
Proof: s(i, j) ∈ N∆(i, j). The result follows from the
definitions of N∆(i, j) and N(i, j) in (5) and (7).
We next introduce the central concept of a trade (see Defi-
nition 4) as the building block of allocations (see Property 3)
and show that trades can at most contain 2 bids on the same
bundle (see Properties 4 and 5).
Definition 4 (Trade): A trade T is a nonempty set of
agents m s.t. (
∑
m∈T im = 0 ∧
∑
m∈T jm = 0) while
@T˜ ( T s.t. T˜ 6= ∅ ∧∑m∈T˜ im = 0 ∧∑m∈T˜ jm = 0
Property 3: Every feasible allocation set NX can be
partitioned into a set of trades: NX = ∪mTm
Proof: Take any feasible allocation set NX . Since NX is
feasible we know that (
∑
m∈NX im = 0 ∧
∑
m∈NX jm = 0).
One of two cases applies. NX can be partitioned into two
feasible non-empty allocation sets, which can be partitioned
again. NX cannot be partitioned into two feasible allocation
sets. Therefore there does not exist a non-empty strict subset
of NX that is feasible and NX is a trade by Def. 4.
Property 4: No trade T can contain more than one bid for
the same complex bundle (i, j) i, j 6= 0.
Proof: The proof goes to show that assuming the opposite
always leads to a trade within a trade, which contradicts our
definition of a trade. We start by assuming that there is a
trade T and two bids l,m ∈ T for a bundle (i, j) i, j 6= 0.
Let T− = T \ {l,m} be the residual trade. For T to be
materially balanced
∑
r∈T− ir = −2i∧
∑
r∈T− jr = −2j has
to hold. Therefore, T− needs to contain at least two bids on
bundles {(−i, 0), (−i,−j), (−i, j)} and at least two bids on
bundles {(0,−j), (−i,−j), (i,−j)}. However, if there exists
a bid r ∈ T− on bundle (−i,−j), then {r, l} ( T is a
trade. Similarly there cannot exist two bids r1, r2 ∈ T− on
bundles (−i, 0) and (0,−j), as then {r1, r2, l} ( T is a trade.
Furthermore, there cannot be two bids r1, r2 ∈ T on bundles
(−i, j) and (i,−j), since {r1, r2} ( T would constitute a
trade. Therefore T− is either exclusively composed of bids on
bundles {(−i, 0), (i,−j)} or of bids on {(0,−j), (−i, j)}. We
will only look at the case of T− consisting of bids on bundles
{(−i, 0), (i,−j)}, as the other case follows similarly. Recall
that
∑
r∈T− ir = −2i∧
∑
r∈T− jr = −2j has to hold for T−
and therefore its bids are on the following bundles [4·(−i, 0), 2·
(i,−j)]. However then T = T− ∪ {l,m} consists of bids with
bundles [4 · (−i, 0), 2 · (i,−j), 2 · (i, j)], which can be split
into two feasible trades of the form [2 · (−i, 0), (i,−j), (i, j)],
contradicting our assumption that T is a trade.
Property 5: No trade can contain more than two bids for the
same simple bundle (i, j) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (−1, 0), (0,−1)}
Proof: We assume, contrary to the above property, that
there exists a trade T with bids l,m, o ∈ T on a bundle (i, 0),
i ∈ {1,−1}. Let T− = T \ {l,m, o}. For T to be feasible∑
r∈T− ir = −3i and therefore there have to be three bids
on bundles {(−i, 0), (−i, 1), (−i,−1)}. However, there cannot
be a bid r ∈ T on bundle (−i, 0). Otherwise {r, l} ( T and
T \ {r, l} are feasible trades, contradicting our definition of
a trade. Therefore, there have to be 3 bids on bundles in
{(−i, 1), (−i,−1)}, which means that at least two bids are
on the same complex bundle which violates Property 4. This
contradiction holds similarly for 3 bids on a bundle (0, j),
j ∈ {1,−1}
With this knowledge about the composition of trades, we
establish the value of the price defining agent as a lower bound
on what an allocated agent could have bid and still be allocated
(see Properties 6 and 7).
Property 6: Given a bidding profile b−l, an agent l interested
in bundle (i, j) and its bid ((i, j), ρ1l ) such that l ∈ N1∗:
ρ2l > ρs1(i,j) =⇒ l ∈ N2∗.
Proof: Given an agent l with bid ((i, j), ρ1l ) such that
l ∈ N1∗, assume contrary to the property that ρ2l > ρs1(i,j)
and l /∈ N2∗. There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: l ∈ {s1(i, j), k1(i, j)}: If so, we know that ρ2l >
ρs1(i,j) ≥ ρ1l and thus l ∈ N2∗ by Property 1. This contradicts
the initial assumption.
Case 2: l /∈ {s1(i, j), k1(i, j)}: Since, by the initial assump-
tion, l /∈ N2∗ and ρ2l > ρs1(i,j) > ρk1(i,j), it follows that
s1(i, j), k1(i, j) /∈ N2∗. Otherwise N2∗ could be improved by
swapping k1(i, j) or s1(i, j) for l.
We will arrive at a contradiction by showing that N1∗
is not optimal when l bids ρ1l . Define T
∆ = N1∗ \ N2∗
and T−∆ = N2∗ \N1∗. Since l, s1(i, j), k1(i, j) ∈ N1∗ and
l, s1(i, j), k1(i, j) /∈ N2∗ we know that l, s1(i, j), k1(i, j) ∈
T∆. Consider improving N1∗ by identifying a balanced
exchange of agents occurring in the process of going from
N1∗ to N2∗ that is independent of agent l.
First, we express the removal of T∆ and addition of T−∆
as a new hypothetical allocation. To do so, we introduce M∆
as a mirror image of T∆ as follows. For every agent m ∈
T∆ define one corresponding agent mM ∈ M∆ with bid
bmM = ((−im,−jm),−ρm). Let kM , sM , lM ∈ M∆ be
the corresponding agents for agents k1(i, j), s1(i, j), l ∈ T∆,
respectively. (M∆ ∪ T−∆) is a feasible allocation, disjoint
from N1∗, that represents the exchange of agents when going
from N1∗ to N2∗.
Second, to show that N1∗ can be improved upon, we identify
a trade in (M∆ ∪ T−∆) that is independent of l as follows.
Let Tk ⊆ (M∆ ∪ T−∆) be a maximum value trade such that
kM ∈ Tk. We know that lM /∈ Tk. Otherwise it would follow
from Properties 4 and 5, and lM , kM ∈ Tk, that sM /∈ Tk.
Then, since −ρs1(i,j) > −ρl, Tk \ {lM} ∪ {sM} would have a
higher value, contradicting our definition of Tk as a maximum
value trade.
Third, we now use Tk to improve upon N1∗, as follows.
Let T−∆k = Tk ∩ T−∆ and let T∆k ⊆ T∆(⊂ N1∗) be the set
of agents that correspond to the agents in the mirror image
Tk ∩M∆. As N2∗ is optimal, N1∗ \ T∆k ∪ T−∆k has a higher
social welfare than N1∗, when l bids ρ2l . However, since l
M /∈
M∆ and therefore l /∈ T∆k , N1∗\T∆k ∪T−∆k has a higher social
welfare than N1∗ independent of what l bids, contradicting
our assumption that N1∗ is optimal when l bids ρ1l .
Property 7: Given a bidding profile b−l, an agent l interested
in bundle (i, j) and its bid ((i, j), ρ1l ) such that l ∈ N1:
ρ2l > ρs1(i,j) =⇒ l ∈ N2.
Proof: As l ∈ N1 and N1 ⊂ N1∗, we know that
l ∈ N1∗. Given l ∈ N1∗ and ρ2l > ρs1(i,j) it follows by
Property 6 that l ∈ N2∗ and thus N1∗ = N2∗, see Corollary 1.
By our initial assumption, we know that ρ2l > ρs1(i,j) > ρk1(i,j)
and by N1∗ = N2∗ we know that s1(i, j), k1(i, j) ∈ N2∗. This
implies that l is not one of the lowest two bids on bundle (i, j)
in N2∗, i.e., l /∈ N2∆. From l /∈ N2∆ ∧ l ∈ N2∗ it follows
that l ∈ N2.
Further, we show that agents in the final allocation cannot
at the same time affect the price they pay for their bundle and
remain in the final allocation (see Property 8).
Property 8: Given a bidding profile b−l and an agent l
interested in bundle (i, j):
l ∈ N1 ∧ l ∈ N2 =⇒ P 1(i,j) = P 2(i,j).
Proof: Recall that s(i, j) is the price defining agent for
bundle (i, j) (see Equation (4)) and therefore it suffices to
show that ρs1(i,j) = ρs2(i,j). Since N ⊂ N∗, it follows from
our initial assumption that l ∈ N1∗ ∧ l ∈ N2∗ and therefore
N1∗ = N2∗, by Corollary 1. As l ∈ N1∧ l ∈ N2, we know
that l /∈ N1∆ ∧ l /∈ N2∆. Since all bids of agents other than l
are fixed by b−l, we know that N1∆ = N2∆ and by extension
ρs1(i,j) = ρs2(i,j).
B. Mechanism design relevant properties
With the above general properties in place, we can now
show that our trade reduction mechanism (Alg. 1) satisfies all
three desired properties: IR, IC and WBB (see section II).
1) Individual Rationality (IR): To ensure IR, we need to
show that agents truthfully reporting their valuation can never
obtain negative utility.
Theorem 1 (Individual Rationality): The mechanism is
Individually Rational, i.e., ul(X(ρl = vl), P (ρl = vl)) ≥ 0
Proof: Assume that trading agent l has a bid b = ((i, j), ρl)
and true valuation vl. If agent l is not allocated l /∈ N, then
its utility is 0. If agent l is allocated l ∈ N, its utility is
ul = vl−P(i,j) = vl−ρs(i,j) = ρl−ρs(i,j) ≥ 0. The inequality
holds because of Property 2. For the auctioneer agent IR holds
due to WBB, see Theorem 3.
2) Incentive Compatible(IC): To show that the mechanism
satisfies IC, we need to show that no agent can strictly increase
its utility by bidding anything but its true valuation.
Theorem 2 (Incentive Compatibility): The mechanism is
Incentive Compatible, i.e. ul(ρl = vl) ≥ ul(ρl 6= vl) ∀l ∈ N .
Proof: To show that no agent can improve its utility by
deviating from bidding its true valuation, we separately examine
agents that would and would not be allocated under truthful
bidding. Let agent l have private valuation vl and let ρ1l = vl.
Case l ∈ N1 (allocated under truthful bidding):
There are two cases to be considered for the bid of agent l.
Either it is allocated or not when bidding ρ2l .
• l ∈ N2: Through property 8, we know that l ∈ N1∧l ∈
N2 implies P 1(i,j) = P
2
(i,j) and the utility of the agent
can be written as ul(ρ2l ) = vl − P 2(i,j) = vl − P 1(i,j) =
ul(ρ
1
l = vl).
• l /∈ N2: Given l /∈ N2, agent l receives zero utility and
its utility is: ul(ρ2l ) = 0 ≤ ul(ρ1l = vl). The inequality
holds because the mechanism is Individually Rational.
Case l /∈ N1 (not allocated under truthful bidding):
There are two cases to be considered for the bid of agent l.
Either it is allocated or not when bidding ρ2l .
• l ∈ N2: Recalling that s(i, j) is the price defining
agent, the utility of agent l can be written as ul(ρ2l ) =
vl − ρs2(i,j) ≤ 0 ≤ u(ρ1l = vl). Indeed, we know
that vl ≤ ρs2(i,j) as otherwise ρ1l = vl > ρs2(i,j)
leads to a contradiction: By Property 7 (index reversed),
ρ1l > ρs2(i,j) and l ∈ N2 implies that l ∈ N1 – a
contradiction. The second inequality holds because the
mechanism is Individually Rational.
• l /∈ N2: As both l /∈ N1 and l /∈ N2, it follows that
the utility of agent l is zero either way.
3) Weak Budget Balance (WBB): To ensure WBB, we need
to show that payments made to the mechanism are larger than
payments made by the mechanism.
Theorem 3 (Weak Budget Balance): The mechanism is
weakly budget balanced.
Proof: Given Property 3, we can split any allocation N
into trades and therefore only have to show that no trade can
run a budget deficit. The budget of a trade T ⊂ N can be
written as the sum of the prices associated with the bundles
of the agents in the trade. Recall that the price for a bundle
(im, jm) is set by the corresponding agent s(im, jm) ∈ N∗,
see equation (4). Alternatively, we can sum over all possible
bundles (i, j) and multiply each price by the number of times
the bundle occurs in T . For this, let |T(i,j)| be the number of
agents in T that bid on bundle (i, j). Then:
Budget(T )=
∑
m∈T
P(im,jm)=
∑
m∈T
ρs(im,jm)=
∑
(i,j)
ρs(i,j)|T(i,j)|
≥
∑
(i,j)

ρs(i,j) + ρk(i,j) if |T(i,j)| = 2
ρs(i,j) if |T(i,j)| = 1
0 if |T(i,j)| = 0
≥ 0.
By Properties 4 and 5, we know that |T(i,j)| can only be 0,
1 or 2. By the way we defined s(i, j), see (3), we know that
2 · ρs(i,j) > ρs(i,j) + ρk(i,j) and therefore the first inequality
holds. The sum that follows in the second line sums over the
valuations of a trade Ts,k that is contained in N∗. Ts,k has the
same bundle composition as the original trade T but consists
exclusively of agents s(i, j) and k(i, j). Since we assumed N∗
to be optimal in Social Welfare, the sum of the valuations of
any trade in N∗ has to yield a non-negative value and therefore
the second inequality holds.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper addressed combined heat and power markets. We
developed a market setting in which not only consumers and
producers, but also agents that want to buy one commodity
and simultaneously sell another, e.g. power-to-heat devices,
can participate. We introduced a trade reduction mechanism
which does not require subsidies and which incentivises agents
to participate truthfully, creating an efficient marketplace in
which agents can participate without the need for sophisticated
bidding strategies. By removing the computational burden
from individual agents, we enable a future energy system
to coordinate between small self-interested energy devices.
Allowing bids on arbitrary bundles and accommodating more
than two energy carriers are future extensions of this work.
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